UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-17-2015

State v. Razo-Chavez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42398

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Razo-Chavez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42398" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5433.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5433

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

BENITO RAZO-CHAVEZ,

OPY

No. 42398
Twin Falls Co. Case No.
CR-2013-12233

)

Defundan~Respondent

)
)

__________ )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLERANDYJ.STOKER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DOUGLAS NELSON
The Roark Law Firm
409 North Main Street
Hailey, ID 83333
(208) 788-2427

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDAN~RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
The District Court Erred When It Modified The Mental
State Element Of the Approved Standard Jury Instructions .................. 4
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................................4

C.

The District Court Erred By Giving A Jury Instruction
That Misstated The Law Regarding The Mental State
Element Of Possession of A Controlled Substance ................... .4

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................ 8
APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 160 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................... 5
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................ 5
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327 (2010) ............................................. 6
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,256 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 7
Statev. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1,333 P.3d 112 (2014) ............................................. 5
State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 129 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 5
State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 314 P.3d 166 (2013) ............................................. 4
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ...................................... 4
State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 953 P.2d 614 (1998) ......................................... 5

STATUTES
l.C. § 37-2709 ...................................................................................................... 1
1.C. § 37-2732 ..................................................................................................... 1

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the judgment of conviction upon a guilty verdict to
one count of possession of Oxycodone. Although not requesting relief, the state
is challenging the district court's modification of the approved elements jury
instruction by striking language that belief the substance is a controlled
substance satisfies the mental state element of possession of a controlled
substance.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officers found Benito Razo-Chavez in possession of a baggie and straw
with an orange powder residue that tested positive for two controlled substances:
Oxycodone and Buprenorphine, the latter being an ingredient in the brand name
drug Suboxone. 1 (Tr., p. 32, L. 5 - p. 36, L. 24; p. 80, L. 25 - p. 89, L. 16.) The
state charged Razo with one count of felony possession of Oxycodone. (R., pp.
62-63.) The matter proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 113-15.) At trial Razo admitted
possessing Suboxone, but denied any knowledge of the presence of Oxycodone.
(Tr., p. 101, L. 5 - p. 103, L. 7; p. 108, L. 24 - p. 109, L. 8; p. 113, Ls. 5-12.)
Over the prosecution's objections, the district court modified the mental
state element of the approved jury instruction from "the defendant either knew it
was [Oxycodone] or believed it was a controlled substance" to "the defendant
either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone." (Tr., p. 120, L. 1 -

Buprenorphine is a Schedule Ill controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2709(e)(2)(i).
Its possession without a prescription is a misdemeanor. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3).

1

1

p. 144, L. 21; R., p. 128 (copy attached as appendix A); ICJI 403 (attached as
Appendix 8).)

Specifically, the district court concluded that the law "requires

knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. In other words, what the
defendant is charged with, not what he had." (Tr., p. 140, Ls. 11-15.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p. 121.) The district court imposed
a sentence of four years with two years determinate, suspended the sentence,
and ordered probation. (R., pp. 144-48.) The state filed a notice of appeal timely
from entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 159-61.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it modified the mental state element of the
approved standard jury instructions?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Modified The Mental State Element Of the
Approved Standard Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
Over the state's objection, the district court modified the mental state

element in the approved elements instruction to require the state to prove that
Razo knew or believed the substance was Oxycodone, rather than requiring
proof that Razo knew it was Oxycodone or believed it was a controlled
substance.

(Compare Appendix A with Appendix B.) The state contends the

district court erred. Moreover, although the state is not requesting any affirmative
relief in this case, this issue is not moot because it is an issue that would
otherwise evade review.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d
414, 430 (2009).

C.

The District Court Erred By Giving A Jury Instruction That Misstated The
Law Regarding The Mental State Element Of Possession of A Controlled
Substance
''The crime of possession of a controlled substance does not require a

specific intent. It only requires the knowledge that one is in possession of the
substance and either knowledge of the identity of the substance (e.g., in this
case that it was [Oxycodone]), or knowledge that the substance was a controlled
substance."

State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 487, 314 P.3d 166, 169 (2013)
4

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The pattern instruction of ICJI 403
correctly states this law. See State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 177, 953 P.2d 614,
617 (1998) (ICJI 403 is modeled on the language specifically approved in this
case, after omitting disapproved language); State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 51314, 129 P.3d 1261, 1262-63 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332,
333-35, 160 P.3d 771, 772-74 (Ct. App. 2007). "It is clear that if one possesses
a controlled substance different from the one he or she thought[,] but believed it
to be a controlled substance, that person is guilty of possession of whatever
controlled substance it turns out to be." Tucker, 131 Idaho at 178, 953 P.2d at
618 (Schroeder, J., concurring).
The district court altered the approved instruction that correctly stated the
mental state element, and instead gave an incorrect instruction that misstated the
law. To the extent Razo relied on a mistake of fact based on his belief that the
substance was Suboxone instead of Oxycodone, such did not negate the general
intent element of the crime and was not a defense. Because the district court
incorrectly stated the law, and created a mistake of fact defense where none
exists, the court erred.
The state is cognizant that if Razo was in fact ignorant of the presence of
Oxycodone such would be a defense to the charge, even if he was aware of the
presence of, and intended to possess, Suboxone. "[T]he defendant's ignorance
of the presence of the substance, or mistaken belief that it was an innocuous
material, if believed by the jury, would be exculpatory." State v. Armstrong, 142
Idaho 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoted in State v. Goggin, 157

5

Idaho 1, 8, 333 P.3d 112, 118 (2014)).

Such was adequately covered by the

definition of possession, however, which informed the jury that "[a] person has
possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical
control of it .... " (R., p. 129.) If the jury believed Razo's testimony that he was in
fact ignorant of the presence of Oxycodone, and was aware only of the presence
of Suboxone, the jury would have necessarily concluded that he did not
"possess" the Oxycodone, as that term is defined by law. 2 It was unnecessary to
misstate the mental state element of the crime to make clear to the jury that
ignorance of the presence of Oxycodone, if evidence of such was believed by the
jury, was a defense to this crime.

D.

This Issue Is Not Moot
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial

controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief."

State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quotations and citations
omitted). There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: "(1) when there
is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising
the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and
thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises
concerns of substantial public interest."

kt

(citations and quotations omitted).

Such a scenario would present itself any time two controlled substances are
mixed, such as when PCP or methamphetamine is added to marijuana. It is the
state's position that a defendant who possessed marijuana he knew was laced
with another controlled substance would be guilty of possession of the lacing
agent regardless of ignorance or mistake of exactly what it was, while a
defendant ignorant of anything but the marijuana is not guilty of possession of
any controlled substance but marijuana.
2
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Although the State is not asking, nor can it be granted, any relief, this issue is not
moot because it will evade review and repeat and because it raises concerns of
substantial public interest.
The district court reasoned that it could not find "any basis in Idaho law"
for the approved instruction, ICJI 403, and concluded the "statute doesn't say
what the instruction says."

(Tr., p. 139, Ls. 20-23.)

Moreover, the court

concluded that the language of ICJI 403 was not supported by the case law and
was incorrect, without regard to the facts of this particular case. (Tr., p. 139, L.
23 - p. 140, L. 21.) Ultimately, the court concluded, the defendant must have
knowledge that the substance he possessed was the substance he was charged
with possessing, and that belief the substance was a different controlled
substance was inadequate to support a conviction. (See Tr., p. 142, Ls. 1-13; p.
143, Ls. 9-21.) Thus, rejection of the approved (and, as shown above, correct)
jury instruction means that the juries could be erroneously instructed, and the
state's burden increased, in every controlled substance case handled by this
particular district judge, and could even become accepted by other district
judges. Although the jury convicted in this case, it is not hard to believe that in a
future case a defendant could be acquitted for a mistake of fact that does not
legally exonerate him. Thus, this case presents concerns of substantial public
interest.
Moreover, the state will not foreseeably have an opportunity to correct this
error.

Upon either conviction or acquittal, the state will be barred by double

jeopardy from seeking any remedy. See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370,

7

256 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2011) (double jeopardy bars state from second
prosecution after acquittal or conviction). For these reasons this issue is capable
of repetition and likely to evade judicial review.

The state's challenge to the

district court's ruling is thus not moot.

CONCLUSION
The district court erred by rejecting ICJI 403 because that instruction is a
correct statement of the law.

Although moot, exceptions allowing appellate

review apply. The state therefore requests this court to consider the issue and
hold that the district court erred.

DATED this 17th day of March, 20 5.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of March, 2015, I caused two
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Deputy Attorney Gen
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APPENDIX A

•

INSTRUCTION NO. 13A

-

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
to-wit: Oxycodone, the State must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about November 2, 2013,

2.

in the State of Idaho,

3.

the defendant, BENITO RAZO-CHAVEZ, possessed any amount of
oxycodone, and

4.

the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.

APPENDIX B

ICJI 403 POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession
of a Controlled Substance, the state must prove each of the
following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant [name] possessed any amount of [name
of substance], and
4. the defendant either knew it was [name of
substance] or believed it was a controlled substance.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find defendant not guilty.
each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.

If

Comment
I.e. § 37-2732(a).
If the charge is possession of a
controlled substance by an inmate, see ICJI 604.
If the defendant is charged with "second offense" drug
possession, I.e. § 37-2739, that issue should be presented
in a bifurcated proceeding.
In State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993), the
Supreme Court held that I.e. § 37-2732(c) does not set
forth any mental state as an element of the crime of
possession of a controlled substance.
"Thus, as [this
statute] does not expressly require any mental element and
I.C. § 18-114 only requires a general intent, we conclude
that the offense only requires a general intent, that is,
the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.n
The Court held that the defendant's lack of knowledge that
the substance was illegal (as a controlled substance) was
irrelevant.
In order to establish possession of a controlled substance,
a defendant need not have actual physical possession of the
substance; the state need only prove that the defendant had
such dominion and control over the substance to establish

constructive possession.
State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512,
887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). Constructive possession of a
controlled substance exists where a nexus between the
accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to
give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was
not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and
intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance.
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 945 P.2d 1390 (Ct. App.
1997) .
Even trace or residual quantities of cocaine fall within
the scope of I.C. § 37-2732(c). State v. Groce, 133 Idaho
144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999).
The statute does not contain a mental element.
The
committee concluded, based upon State v. Lamphere, 130
Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), a mental element as set forth
in element 4 should be included.

